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The Policy of Russia towards the European Union 
 
Main theses of the report: 
• The foreign policy of the Russian Federation towards the European Union seems to 
be reactive and devoid of any plan. 
• The implementation of the Russian policy concerning the EU has been poor. Its low 
performance mainly stems from the lack of a strategic view on the objectives that 
Russia should pursue towards the EU. Russia hesitates whether to support a more 
integrated Union or to fear that it would make Russia a junior partner. The future 
development of the relations will, to a large extent, depend on the direction of the 
evolution of the European integration. In a vision of Europe that Russia would find 
attractive, supranational authorities would not exert dominance. 
• In 1990s, Russian policy towards the EU was subordinated to the relations between 
the RF and the US, and their rivalry with respect to the shape of the European order. 
Therefore, it lacked autonomy, despite Russian authorities’ official declarations that 
the European direction of Russian foreign policy was a priority. 
• After Vladimir Putin came to power, the European direction started to play a more 
important role in RF foreign policy, with a Russia-EU rapprochement in the years 
2000-2001. However, after September 11, 2001, Russia turned its attention from the 
EU to the US. Since the crisis which followed the use of power against Iraq in 
2002/2003, Russia focused on developing closer relations with Germany and France, 
at the expense of the EU as a whole. 
• The key issue of the Russian policy towards the EU is the Russian perception of the 
EU and the process of the European integration. The fact that the democratic legal 
order within the EU is equal to the political order, with all individual members enjoying 
the same rights, is ignored. Russia supports a strong Europe as a counterbalance to 
the US dominance on the one hand, but it fears that the integrated Europe would 
push it out of the European space. Russia demands special treatment of Brussels. 
• Russia’s approach to the EU involves mainly political instruments. It takes advantage 
of such assets of a superpower as the permanent membership in the UN Security 
Council, with a power of veto, geostrategic location, etc. The EU tools chiefly include 
legal and economic measures. Natural resources of the RF as well as gas pipeline 
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networks serve to develop closer relations rather than as a means of pressure, due to 
a strong mutual relationship in this field. 
• The political cooperation tends to be rhetoric, which is due to a relative weakness of 
both actors and their objection to the US dominance. It is therefore easier to 
cooperate in matters concerning general and extra-European issues rather than 
direct European issues. The economic cooperation results from the way both actors’ 
economies complement each other. The so-called common economic areas, 
including: economy, external security, internal security, science, education and 
culture, are thought to be a more developed form of cooperation; although, there is a 
risk that the cooperation in these areas will fail to go beyond declarations. 
• The rivalry between Russia and the EU primarily stems from a collision of their 
interests: Russia struggles to protect its sphere of influence whereas Europe 
continues to expand. Moscow’s greatest fears concern the possibility that the 
European political activity would shift towards the Commonwealth of Independent 
States and that, in a long-term perspective, some of these states, particularly 
Ukraine, would accede to the EU. This process is reinforced by the conflicting political 
values, as both actors’ political orders continue to evolve in opposite directions. 
• The bilateral relations which Russia has established with France and Germany are of 
special importance for its policy towards the EU. Good relations with these states are 
believed to enable Moscow to put pressure on and influence the EU policy. They also 
result from the view that the EU policy is determined mainly by its individual members 
(particularly the German-French engine). 
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1. Russia-EU relations in 1990s 
In 1990s, the relations with Europe (including individual states, European 
Communities and the European Union) were not an autonomous element of the RF foreign 
policy. To a large extent, they resulted from the fact that the RF subordinated its stance on 
Europe to a global policy of maintaining a position that would be equal to that of the US in the 
post-Cold War international order (however, it was meant to be achieved by means of 
cooperation rather than confrontation). A community of Russia and the West in terms of 
basic political values emerged (or it seemed to emerge), including democracy, human rights 
and free market economy. It manifested itself, inter alia, in an idea of a common European 
house, inherited from the Mikhail Gorbachev’s era and last years of the Soviet Union. 
The Kremlin has repeatedly expressed its hopes concerning the return of the unity of 
the European continent, which would, by the force of events, make Russia one of key actors 
in the post-Cold War European order (it also meant that the US would withdraw from the 
active involvement in European affairs). At the same time, Russian authorities continued to 
differentiate between Western and Eastern European issues1. This was the opportunity to 
see that they lacked any vision on what kind of policy towards the former satellite states of 
the Soviet Union – the Central European states - should be adopted. Russian policy showed 
an objective attitude towards these states and Russia hoped that good relations with the 
West would help it either establish a sort of condominium (or even a former area of influence) 
or make them a buffer zone, separating it from Western Europe. Such an approach to the 
issue of Central Europe resulted from the fact that Russia did not believe that they could 
accede to NATO and the EU. 
One could think that during the second half of 1990s the Russian policy should have 
undergone a sort of ‘Europeanization’, instead of pursuing a ‘global’ policy introduced by the 
Soviet Union. Principally, one could support this idea by the newly established economic ties. 
The European states became Russia’s main creditors. They had the largest share in Russian 
trade. Russia focused on the relationships with individual European states rather than with 
the EC/EU as a whole. Although the official documents (such as ‘Foreign Policy Conception 
of the Russian Federation’ - 1993) described the European direction as a priority, in 1990s 
the EU played de facto a minor role in Russian foreign policy. The fact that in early 1990s 
Russia planned to enter into an agreement with the EU, which would be similar to the 
association agreements signed by Central European states aspiring to EU membership2, did 
not change this policy. Moscow concentrated on international security and the rivalry with the 
                                                 
1 T. W. Jur’jewa, Jewropiejskaja politika Rossii, [w:] A. W. Torkunow, Sowriemiennyje 
mieżdunarodnyje otnoszenija i mirowaja politika, Moscow: Proswieszczenije MGIMO 2004, p. 779. 
2 Nadezhda Arbatova, Wladimir Ryzkov, ‘Rossija i EC: sbliżenije na fonie razrywa?’, Rossija w 
globalnoj politikie [Russia in Global Affairs], Vol. 3, № 1, January/February 2005, p. 198. 
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US for the shape of the European order. The central issue of the European direction in the 
RF policy was the activity and future of NATO and the CSCE/OSCE3. 
The key document laying down the framework of the Russia-EU relationships was the 
‘Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Russia and the European Union’ (PCA) 
adopted June 24, 1994. It entered into force December 1, 1997, and contained a declaration 
of an intense cooperation of both parties, with no assumption that Russia would become a 
member of the EU. It is worth pointing out that this document provided for the harmonization 
of some Russian and EU law. The EU postponed the ratification of the treaty until 1997 
because of its negative stance on the war in Chechnya. In its European policy, Moscow 
focused on the relations with the most important EU states: Germany, France, Great Britain 
and Italy – and not with the Union itself, which resulted largely from the weakness of this new 
organization. Russia considered the EU chiefly as the economic partner, underestimating the 
political dimension of the integration4. It expected that if the Union becomes self-dependent, 
the American position would weaken, although the integration was not seen as a threat to RF 
interests. Moscow identified the growing autonomy of European security policy only in the 
context of the deteriorating role of NATO, which made Russia support Western European 
Union’s initiatives, hoping that it would eventually become self-dependent5. 
 
2. The European direction in Russia’s foreign policy under Vladimir Putin 
After Vladimir Putin came to power, Russia’s foreign policy changed dramatically. The 
European direction could not be excluded from this evolution, especially since the Kremlin 
recognized it as one of its priorities. 
 
a. The evolution of Russia’s foreign policy under Vladimir Putin 
As Putin was gaining power in Russia (as the Prime Minister in the second half of 
1999), the Kremlin had to cope with the consequences of the war in Kosovo. It was a severe 
defeat in terms of prestige, on the one hand, and the humanitarian legitimization of the 
intervention was considered a threat to Russia’s own security. Russia started to fear that the 
humanitarian intervention would be a pretext for the introduction, by the West, of ‘the new 
rules’, enabling it to use power on the basis of its own view (Russia would thus become a 
victim of the conflict in Chechnya). Such fears were, of course, exaggerated, because, for 
instance, Russia’s nuclear arsenal still guarantees protection in case of any ‘classical’ 
                                                 
3 Agnieszka Bryc, Cele polityki zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej [The Objectives of Russian 
Federation’s Foreign Policy] Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek 2004, pp. 65-66. 
4 It is worth mentioning that the political dimension of the integration was in that time of little 
importance. 
5 Ibidem, p. 77; see also: Jur’jewa, Jewropiejskaja politika..., op.cit., p. 779. 
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aggression. Initially, Russia reacted to the Kosovo crisis quite traditionally: it increased anti-
Western rhetoric and tightened mutual relations with China. Putin announced the end of ’the 
younger brother’ policy, and at the same time he gave priority to the strengthening of the RF 
position across the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
The withdrawal from the confrontational policy towards the West – regarded as a 
resignation from the desire to create a multipolar international order – was enabled by a 
partial change in the way Russian authorities assessed the international environment. The 
Kosovo crisis, which raised fears of establishing a cold peace between Russia and the 
Western states, finally ended, despite a threatening dispute over an airport in Pristina. After 
that, the mutual relations slowly started to warm up. 
After Putin was appointed acting president January 1, 2000, his tactics became to 
wait and not to involve in any official visits outside Russia6. In Europe, Russia was almost 
isolated, due to the economic crash, the second war in Chechnya and the way Putin came to 
power, which was seen as a threat to democracy. The new leader decided to start rebuilding 
Russia’s position by opening a dialogue with Great Britain. Then, after he was elected 
president in March 2000, he visited Italy and Spain. One of the first Russian initiatives was a 
proposal to create a pan-European non-strategic anti-ballistic missile system, that would 
cover the whole Europe, and attempts to sustain the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty7 as the US 
planned to walk away from it. Such an approach showed that Russia’s policy towards Europe 
still lacked autonomy and it was subordinated to the rivalry with the US, and treated primarily 
as a means of pressure. The fourth country Putin visited was Germany. France had to wait to 
welcome the Russian president until October 2000, which was a consequence of its strong 
criticism regarding the Kremlin’s policy in Chechnya – seen as an intervention in the internal 
affairs of Russia8. 
The European direction of Russia’s foreign policy became a priority from the very 
beginning of Putin’s presidency, overtaking the CIS direction9. This ‘European choice’ was 
contained in the conception of multipolar world, which would be based on the rules of 
international law, the UN and attempts to manage globalization. The Russian authorities 
assumed that the RF would remain an indispensable element of the European order. Such 
an evolution in foreign policy resulted, to a great extent, from a historical tradition of Russia's 
                                                 
6 S. Morozow, Dipłomatija W. W. Putina. Wnieszniaja politika Rossii 1999-2004 gg., Sankt-
Peterburg:Izdatielskij Dom <<Izmajłowskij>> 2004, p. 32. The official justification was that the prime 
minister and president cannot leave the country at one time. 
7 Signed in 1972. 
8 Morozow, op.cit., pp. 67-72. 
9 See: Foreign Policy Conception of the Russian Federation, June 28, 2000 
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permanent presence in European affairs10. This was emphasized by the deteriorating 
relations with the US. 
In the years 2000-2001, the Russian-European relations underwent a revival. The 
division between the Western and Eastern European policy remained, with the latter virtually 
non-existent. No political conception concerning Poland and other Central European states 
was developed; there was only some hope to again open this territory to Russia’s influence. 
The fact that the official documents concerning Russia’s foreign policy, prepared in 2000, 
include virtually no reference to this area, serves as a good example11. 
 
b. The consequences of the Russian-American rapprochement after 
September 11, 2001, for the European direction of the RF foreign policy 
In late 2001, partly owing to the US reaction to 9/1112 and the following evolution of 
the international situation, Russia adopted a new direction of the European foreign policy. Its 
key elements included a withdrawal both from the rivalry with the US regarding the post-Cold 
War international order and from the global foreign policy. Putin, feeling unable to defeat the 
US, chose a strategy, which in Western political commentary was referred to as 
‘bandwagoning’ – joining the stronger party. Simultaneously, he decided to strengthen 
Russia’s position as an Eurasian superpower. Russia resigned as a superpower and gave up 
prestige in favor of a pragmatic approach to foreign policy. The symbol of giving up both 
global aspirations and confrontation with the US was the closure in 2001 of the Lourdes 
surveillance station in Cuba and a naval base in Vietnam's Cam Ranh. 
One might expect that the regional emphasis of the RF foreign policy (aiming to make 
Russia a strong Eurasian superpower) would stop the approach, whereby the relations with 
the US are superior to European policy. However, the first consequence of the Russian-
American rapprochement was a decline in Moscow’s interests in the European direction, as 
well as a stagnation in the Russia-EU relations. For the second time since the Cold War, the 
Kremlin seemed to be under the illusion that the setting up of the Russian-American 
‘condominium’, acting as an axis of the international order, is highly probable. Such a view on 
the state of international affairs remained until the end of 2002, when the rising crisis in Iraq 
resulted in another about-face in Russian foreign policy. 
                                                 
10 Jur’jewa, op.cit., p. 774. 
11 Such as: Foreign Policy Conception of the Russian Federation and Security Conception of the 
Russian Federation. 
12 Making the war on terror a central element of a new US strategic doctrine. 
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Russia focused on creating a new formula for its relations with NATO13 and the 
strategic dialogue with the US, as well as intensifying its relations with individual European 
states, particularly with Great Britain, Germany and France. In 2002, the Russian diplomatic 
activity apparently revealed a new way of perceiving NATO. Moscow judged that the role of 
the Alliance was declining (as a natural consequence of the fact that it was ignored by the 
Americans), on the one hand, and the Russian-NATO relations adopted a new form, putting 
declarations into practice, on the other. 
The Russian-American rapprochement at the expense of Europe partly resulted from 
a similar view on the world of the Cold-War rivals. Robert Kagan described the EU as living 
in a post-modern paradise14. According to this terminology, Russia has remained in the 
Hobbes’ jungle. Despite this paradox – the EU’s strength is on the rise (somewhat 
unintentionally and not at all deliberately) and the RF even more often lacks tools to pursue a 
real superpower policy – it is Moscow, not Brussels, that is closer to Washington in many 
issues, including the use of power15. 
 
c. The rapprochement and disappointment with Europe: from the Iraqi crisis to 
the Ukrainian one 
United States’ aiming at the settlement of the Iraqi issue through the use of force, 
coupled with a lack of true benefits for Moscow – despite its concessions policy towards 
Washington – made the Kremlin see an opportunity to oppose the US. The way to achieve 
this was improving relations with France and Germany, which were the most determined 
opponents of the use of power without UN Security Council’s consent. The Paris-Berlin-
Moscow axis would remain a permanent element of the European policy16. Russian 
representatives’ announcements made in 2003 are quite similar to those made in 1998, 
when Russia still hoped to hold back NATO’s enlargement. During the Iraqi crisis, Russia 
tried to maintain good relations with all key European states, creating an anti-American axis - 
with France and Germany, as well as cooperating with the states comprising the anti-Iraqi 
coalition – Great Britain and Italy. 
The rise of activity within the European direction still did not mean a breakthrough in 
Russian policy towards the EU as a whole. It was partly caused by the fact that the Union 
                                                 
13 The ‘19+1’ formula (NATO members agree a joint position which is then presented to Russia) 
was replaced with a ‘20’ formula (within the Joint NATO-Russia Council the RF enjoys the same rights 
as the members of the Alliance. 
14 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. 
15 It is evidenced, for instance, by the statements of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, in 
which Russia declares its right to an pre-emptive attack on terrorists’ bases outside its territory, which 
is in fact a copy of the American conception of the pre-emptive use of force. 
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was entering the last phase of the enlargement (which drew most of European politicians’ 
attention) and that both Russia and the Union had little to offer to each other, with the 
exception of political declarations. Moscow’s superpower rhetoric, which was even stronger 
in the 2003/2004 pre-election period, played an important role, too17. In 2003, Russia 
intensified its campaign for the integration of the post-Soviet area, which was expressed by 
the conception of a Common Economic Space (CES). As a consequence, an idea emerged 
to strengthen Russia’s position through an activity in the two economic areas: the EU and the 
CIS, the latter serving also as a way to prevent the CIS members from integrating with the 
EU. 
Two events of 2004 had a great impact on the European direction of Russian foreign 
policy. In September, a terrorist attack took place in Bieslan. Its consequence, apart from 
further centralization of power, was the intensification of anti-Western rhetoric, reflecting a 
growing atmosphere of ‘a besieged fortress’ among Russian authorities. Ukraine's election 
crisis in late 2004 had even more serious effect, especially in terms of the policy towards the 
EU. On the one hand, Poland and Lithuania got involved in it, with the support of Javier 
Solana, acting on behalf of the EU. On the other hand, the mutual relations between Russia 
and key EU states, particularly Germany and France, were not strong enough to hold back 
the EU’s involvement in solving this crisis. 
 
3. Russia’s perception of the European Union 
The fact that Russia regards the EU as a uniform international actor imposes serious 
ambiguities and shows an appalling lack of strategic vision. On the one hand, Moscow 
considers the Union to be a potential counterbalance for the US dominance, repeatedly 
declaring a strategic partnership with the EU18. On the other hand, it apparently fears that 
Europe could become too strong and that Russia would be totally excluded from the new 
European order. 
 
a. The essence of the European integration 
One of the main obstacles that inhibit the development of the Europe-Russia relations 
is Moscow’s partial misunderstanding of the European integration. The EU is principally an 
association of sovereign states, based on the rule of both international and community law. 
                                                                                                                                                        
16 After Angela Merkel came to power in Germany, this country might less eagerly participate in 
anti-American actions. 
17 Timofei Bordachev, Is the Europeanization of Russia Over?, Rossija w globalnoj politikie 
[Russia in Global Affairs], Vol. 2, № 2, April/June 2004, p. 88. 
18 One ought to point out that Russian politicians tend to use a term of ‘strategic partnership’ to 
refer to the RF’s relations not only with the EU, but also with the US, China and Germany. 
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However, the Russian vision of the world order assumes that the international law should 
provide for special rights and obligations for the most powerful states, giving them a 
privileged position19. The Kremlin fails to understand that Luxemburg enjoys the same voice 
as Germany does (although their votes have different weights), and, moreover, other states 
will take it into account. Therefore, Russia has repeated the same failure, hoping that 
agreements with main EU actors can change the Union’s institutional and legal framework in 
favor of the RF. 
Such a view on the EU is quite apparent in the way Russia treats Poland and other 
Central and Eastern European states. Russian elites assume that Poland serves only as an 
object of a game played by the strongest states and the Eurobureaucracy, on the assumption 
that Moscow’s ‘Big Brother’ has been simply replaced by the one seated in Brussels. Another 
supposition is that the membership in the EU will be harmful to Poland and it will cause 
economic losses, including increased imports to Poland or a denial to export Polish goods to 
European markets. The fact that the political cultures of Russia and the EU do not square 
with each other, coupled with the following mutual misunderstanding, can be a key problem 
in the long-term process of shaping positive relations20. 
What Russian analysts blame as a cause of the present state of the European 
integration (unfavorable from the Russian interests’ point of view) is Brussels’ bureaucracy. 
They would like to see the Europe of de Gaulle, Churchill or Adenauer – an association of 
sovereign states, but what they actually see is the rising Eurobureaucracy and a new sort of 
political correctness21. The frequently repeated opinion is that bureaucracy plays a 
disproportionately large role in Europe. It has created a sort of ‘political correctness’, an 
egalitarian ideology, that opposes the use of power, supports pro-environmental initiatives 
and rejects extremism22. Another factor responsible for both developing EU integration and 
its increasing role in the international arena is, as Russians perceive it, the activity of the 
European Commission. It has gained many competencies of national governments and 
parliaments, while its aiming at making the European economy the most competitive in the 
world (Lisbon Strategy) resulted in that it has seized the bulk of the decisions regarding the 
common market23. 
                                                 
19 It does not refer only to the current vision, as it may be tracked back over the last few centuries. 
20 It is worth recalling the opinion of an outstanding practitioner of Realpolitik, Henry Kissinger, 
that a clash of powers is ‘manageable’, but the clash of values will inevitably cause a conflict. 
21 Siergiej Karaganow, Second option for Russian-European relations, RIA Novosti, 26.05.2005, 
Johnson’s Russia List #9161, www.cdi.org. 
22 Siergiej Karaganow, ‘Rossija i Jewropa połuczili <<okno wozmożnostiej>>‘, Rossijskaja gazieta 
21.06.2005, www.globalaffairs.ru/articles/4210.html. 
23 Timofei Bordachev, ‘Prizrak swobody’, Rossija w globalnoj politikie [Russia in Global Affairs], 
Vol. 3, № 3, May-Jun 2005, p. 10. 
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The European kind of political culture is very distant from the Russian model. It is 
regarded only in terms of Realpolitik and a zero-sum game, in which some countries win and 
some lose. Russia underestimates the ‘soft power’ of the EU. The increasing understanding 
of the EU model, observed in recent years among Russians, fails to change this view. There 
is no department in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that is responsible for the relations 
with the EU. 
 
b. Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and 
Defense Policy 
Under Putin, Russia’s stance towards the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) evolved from support and cooperation to considering the common policy to be only 
an EU tool, designed to weaken the RF position. The Kremlin has continued to fear that it 
would be excluded from the decision-making process regarding European issues and that 
the EU would take actions across the area which is thought to be Russia’s sphere of vital 
interests. If CFSP’s efficiency were on the rise, Russia’s capabilities of dividing European 
states would diminish, significantly reducing Moscow’s power in the arena of the European 
politics. 
In the connection with the European Constitution crisis24, Russian commentators 
spotted the decreasing chances for the EU to develop a uniform foreign policy and to 
become a geopolitical center of the international order25. Moreover, Russia can see that 
Europe has divided in two as regards the US role in Europe, which consequently diminishes 
any perspectives for a joint foreign policy. It does not mean, however, that Russia assumes 
the JSFP to be nothing but an utopian project. Serious Moscow’s fears resulted from the 
setting up of a uniform policy concerning areas outside Europe, as was the case of the 
European Neighborhood Policy. In the framework of the Wider Europe policy, the EU treats 
all its neighbors, from Morocco to Russia, equally, with no special policy towards any 
particular state. Russia fears that it will lose some of its privileged position in the relations 
with the EU26. 
Growing ambitions of the European states regarding defense issues (first within the 
Western European Union and then within the UE) initially provoked virtually no reaction on 
the part of Russia, despite the fact that, through an associated membership, the WUE 
entered the area thought to be the sphere of Russia’s influence27. One also have to mention 
                                                 
24 Caused by the rejection of the treaty establishing a constitution. for Europe in referendums in. 
France and the Netherlands. 
25 See for instance: Karaganow, Rossija i Jewropa…, op.cit. 
26 Dmitrij W. Susłow, <<Jewropiejskij wybor>> pod woprosom, Niezawisimaja gazieta, 5.11.2004. 
27 The Baltic states joined the WEU as associated members. 
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Russians’ hopes that this will weaken both NATO and trans-Atlantic relations as well. As 
soon as plans concerning the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) within the 
framework of CFSP became more concrete, Russia started to react ambiguously. On the one 
hand, Moscow continued to see this policy as a chance that the European defense policy 
would separate from NATO and consequently that it would weaken the US role on the 
European continent. On the other hand, the RF fears that it would be once again pushed out 
of the newly built European regional security structures. It is heightened by the fact that, so 
far, Russia has failed to take part in the process of creating a European defense policy. The 
most significant initiative in this matter was a conception of a common European-Russian 
Theater Missile Defense, put forward by president Putin in 2000. 
Russia hesitates whether to ignore the EU’s attempts to build a common foreign, 
security and defense policy, or to fear that it will be totally excluded from the European 
security system. The Union is regarded as a threat that is even greater than NATO, because 
it has been granted access to many areas of cooperation within NATO, while it has remained 
isolated from the decision-making process within the EU, which in Russians’ view lacks 
transparency. The first option is evidenced by a quiet withdrawal of its peace-keeping forces 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina short before the EU was to take this mission over28. They 
ceased to be necessary as an element of a global play with Washington. However, the crisis 
in Ukraine showed that the influence of such medium-sized countries like Poland may be 
strengthened by the support of Brussels (i.e. the European Commission or the European 
Parliament). Russia was even more astonished, as it did not believe that Poland could 
significantly influence the EU Eastern policy, especially after Warsaw’s lasting relations with 
partners such as Germany have greatly declined following the war in Iraq. 
 
c. The EU enlargement with Central and Eastern European states 
Initially, in the first half of 1990s, plans to include the countries of the former Eastern 
bloc within the EU were not seen by Russia as a threat to its interests. Moreover, in the 
context of NATO’s enlargement, some Russians regarded them as an advantageous 
alternative. Not before the late 1990s did the awareness emerge among the Russian elites 
that the new division of Europe might prove more significant and enduring, as a 
consequence of integration processes within the EU29. Regarding the EU enlargement as an 
objective process was replaced by tracking new problems, such as an access to the 
Kaliningrad region or rivalry in the post-Soviet area. 
                                                 
28 In December 2004. 
29 W. G. Baranowskij, Rossija i formirowanije nowoj jewropejskoj architektury, [w:] A. W. 
Torkunow, Wnieszniaja politika Rossijskoj Federacii 1992-1999, Moscow: Rosspen 2000, pp. 163-
164. 
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Russia is aware that the EU enlargement with the Central and Eastern European 
states resulted in a present increase in the number of EU members supporting close trans-
Atlantic relations. The accession of Romania and Bulgaria will help strengthen American 
influence. This process contributes to the weakness of the Union due the increasing number 
of disputes, on the one hand, and to the growing role of the US in Europe, on the other, 
which also does not satisfy Moscow. The voice of new members, with deeply rooted fears of 
Russian imperial policy, may pose an obstacle to the establishment of a strategic Russia-EU 
partnership. At the same time, Russia aims at maintaining the division between the old and 
the new members of Western institutions (both the EU and NATO) and supports this division 
in its policy, for instance, by refusing to extend the PCA agreement to new member states. 
Moscow’s fears of further EU enlargements were softened due to a dispute that 
continues to grow within the Union, concerning the rationale and limits of further 
enlargement, especially as to the Balkan states, Turkey and the CIS states. Moscow expects 
that the reluctance of European societies towards further enlargement will inhibit this 
process. 
 
d. The Constitutional Treaty 
Russian elites unambiguously negatively assessed the idea of the Constitutional 
Treaty. The most important accusation was that the Treaty would extend the already great 
powers of Brussels at the cost of powers of sovereign states. The Commission was accused 
of releasing itself from Parliament’s control and a political self-dependence. If the Treaty was 
accepted, the EU would become a sort of a state itself, replacing the confederation with a 
federation. The Commission would then become a government, the Parliament would act as 
a real parliament and a single minister for foreign affairs would enable a single foreign, 
security and defense policy30. Russian analysts described the Treaty as unrealistic, complex 
and strengthening the deficit of democracy. 
Russians found the defeat of the current Constitutional Treaty to be the most 
beneficial for them. Gleb Pawlowsky, a political consultant close to the Kremlin, says that the 
rejection of the Treaty will limit the ambitions of the Union’s bureaucracy and will help 
improve Russia-EU relations31. A consequence of the defeat should be a return to the 
national model of the EU foreign policy. Much of Russian reluctance to the Constitution is 
based on a conviction that if it were passed, a pseudo-federal European state would emerge, 
with no perspectives for Russia to accede to it. 
                                                 
30 Jarosław Szimow, Jewroutopizm i jewroreakcija, Polit.ru, www.globalaffairs.ru/ 
articles/4011.html (11.05.2005) 
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The Russian approach to the strengthening of EU competences is still characterized 
by fears of the centralization of the decision-making process on the European level, which 
would significantly diminish Moscow’s capabilities in the field of dividing individual member 
states. 
 
e. Russia’s view on the European integration 
Establishing close relations with Europe, at the beginning of Putin’s presidency, to a 
certain extent revealed the Russian view on the European integration. The key issue seems 
to be whether the Kremlin aims at active participation in the integration processes, with a 
suggestion of its potential membership in the EU. In 1990s, the Russian government did not 
exclude such a possibility. The RF politics regarding the EU, however, underwent a 
noteworthy evolution as compared to the era of Boris Yeltsin. Although in 1990s Russia 
claimed that it observed the same values as the West – under Putin, commentators refer to a 
Russian variety of democracy and the common interests rather than the shared values32. 
In November 1999, Moscow adopted the ‘Russian Federation Middle Term Strategy 
Towards the European Union (2000 –2010)’ and presented it during Russia-EU summit in 
Helsinki October 22, 2000. It was a kind of a response to the ‘Common Strategy of The 
European Union on Russia’, adopted at the Cologne European Council in June 1999. 
Russian priorities included: imparting a strategic dimension to the relations, guarantying 
Russia’s interests in the process of EU enlargement, the inflow of investment and increasing 
the access of Russian goods to EU markets. Russia’s strategy with respect to the required 
model of its relations with the EU assumed that the partnership will develop on the treaty 
basis. The RF did not claim to join or to form an association with the EU33. 
Russia has expressed its will to establish the partnership with the EU, but, firstly, the 
Russian way of understanding a ‘partnership’ is quite specific, and secondly, the Kremlin 
would like to build it on the basis of common interests (but not on the basis of shared values). 
Moscow wants to be treated exceptionally by the EU – as a superpower with a great natural 
resources potential. In terms of concrete postulates, Russia insisted upon introducing a visa-
free regime for Russians in the EU, an access to the common market in the framework of the 
CES and a voice in the decision-making process34. 
                                                                                                                                                        
31 Vladimir Isachenkov, Kremlin-linked analyst says EU constitution rejections bode well for 
Russia, AP 16.06.2005; see also: Bordachev, ‘Prizrak swobody’, op.cit., pp. 8-14. 
32 Igor Torbakov, Russia faces foreign policy debate for 2005, EurasiaNet Commentary 
18.01.2005, www.eurasianet.org. 
33 Jur’jewa, op.cit., pp. 793-794. 
34 EU’s Eastern borders, The Economist, 25-31.06.2005. 
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The Russia-EU cooperation should also serve to secure civilization and economic 
development; the European states are considered to be a source of foreign investment that 
is indispensable for improving the economic and civilizational standards in Russia. At the 
same time, the RF intends to support the creation of a common economic space without the 
lost of sovereignty, which is sometimes thought to be directly associated with the EU 
membership. Since Russia has to cope with the issue of reducing the negative impact of 
globalization, the integration with the EU would be the best way of participating in the world 
economy. 
The issue of a possible integration with the EU also constitutes the question of 
Russia’s identity in the international arena. Should one speak of it as the return of a ‘prodigal 
son’ to Europe or – due to a unique Eurasian identity, which is a mixture of the East and the 
West – Russia will never become a real participant of the European order, as other countries 
(EU members) do. It is a partly linked with the question of the relations between the 
European and other directions in Russian foreign policy. 
 
4. Instruments in mutual relations between Russia and the European Union 
Russia and the EU differ in terms of political, economic and cultural potential. They 
have different strategic culture, the way they act on the international scene is also different: 
Russia has a tradition of being a superpower while the EU is a new kind of an international 
community. The wide range of differences implies that the foreign policy instruments used by 
both actors differ greatly, too. Russia introduces chiefly political measures (although the role 
of economy is on the rise), whereas the Union uses mostly economic and legal instruments 
(the latter also uses political measures but they can have weaker impact in case of Russia 
than, for instance, a promise of association would have in case of smaller countries). 
 
a. Russia 
Russia’s fundamental asset in its policy towards the EU has been the traditional asset 
of a superpower – the political potential, including the permanent membership in the UN 
Security Council; the participation in G-8 (although Russia owes it to the support of the 
European states); special relations with other superpowers, particularly with the US, China 
and India; geostrategic location; still existing influence in many countries, including those to 
which the West has little access. 
Despite the loss of the superpower status of the former USSR, Russia has remained 
an important element of the post-Cold War international order. Therefore, it is a welcome 
partner in possible international coalitions. If the EU wanted to push a conception that would 
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be different from the American one in the international arena, then Russia\s political support 
could prove a key factor to help realize it. For instance, the Kyoto Protocol could pass thanks 
to Russia’s ratification, and in exchange for that the EU agreed to Russia’s accession to the 
WTO. 
Moscow gives proofs of being a superpower to the leaders of individual states (such 
as Germany, France or Italy) through a number of declarations on strategic partnership (and 
vice versa). At the same time, the good relations with these states provide the Kremlin with 
another political instrument: the capacity to weaken the EU by means of boosting its internal 
divisions. The other way of possible limiting EU powers in the international arena is the 
cooperation of Russia with other superpowers, particularly with the US. 
A peculiar kind of instrument which the Kremlin can use in its policy towards the EU is 
the Russian natural resources potential. The Union needs to diversify the sources of oil and 
natural gas, but Russia can manage this instrument as a means of political pressure only to a 
very limited extent. Supplying energy resources to the EU states has remained the main 
source of financing the present and future development of Russia but one should remember 
about the principle of mutual balance between the two sides. Therefore, natural resources 
supplies can hardly be treated as an instrument used only by Russia, due to a strong and 
quite symmetrical mutual relation in this matter. Also, both the existing and planned pipelines 
designed to deliver the resources to the European market can hardly serve as a means of 
pressure on Russia. It can change in a longer-term perspective, as volume of available 
resources shrinks significantly and losing only some of its consumers would do harm to RF 
financial interests. The efficiency of the gas tap control policy also depends on the rate of 
supplies diversification in a particular country. Most EU member states are not as unilaterally 
dependent on Russia’s supplies, as Poland and Central-Eastern European states. Moreover, 
the Western states do not fear of cutting off the supplies: in the peak period of the Cold War, 
in 1980s, a construction of the USSR/West Europe pipeline began, despite a strong 
American protest. The cohesion of the European Union still has to cope with the different 
goals of Western and Central European states: the former want to diversify their supplies by 
means of Russian resources, whereas the latter aim at freeing themselves from the Russian 
monopoly. 
 
b. The European Union 
The basic tool of EU policy towards Russia (which, as one should emphasize, need 
not be used in a conscious and planned manner, due to a specific Union’s political culture) 
remains the law, both international and that created by the EU. A condition for the practical 
Russian-EU cooperation is bringing the two legal systems closer to each other. The 
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resolutions to gradually adjust the Russian economic legislation to that of the Union were 
already contained in the Russian-EU PCA Agreement. Adopting European regulations 
provokes protests in Russia, where the law is thought to be an element of Russian tradition. 
The implementation of the common spaces will imply even more harmonization of Russian 
law with the European regulations. At the same time, Russia has not been granted (and 
nothing indicates that it will be) the right to participate in the decision-making process 
regarding the legal instruments that concern this country. This process supports a one-sided 
EU advantage. As Russian political scientists point out, the real adjustment of Russian law to 
the Union’s law, chiefly regarding the economic sphere, is performed without a strategic 
vision for the Russian-EU relations35. 
An important EU’s asset as to the relations with Russia (the one which Russia lacks) 
is the efficient bureaucracy, which turns out to be very useful during the negotiations. It was 
apparent both during the negotiations on the EU enlargement effects for Russia as well as in 
the case of the so-called road maps for the creation of the common spaces, negotiated and 
adopted in May 2005. At the same time, engagement in the talks with the European 
Commission to a certain extent diminishes Moscow’s capabilities of exploiting political 
measures in order to be granted concessions in legal and institutional matters. By pursuing 
negotiations with the Commission, Russia has also been deprived of the capacity to divide 
EU states. 
Another EU instrument useful in the relations with Russia is the Union’s economic 
potential, as well as the demand, on the part of Russia, for foreign investment. The EU 
remains the RF’s main trade partner (55% of Russian trade, after the enlargement) and one 
of the most important consumer of Russian resources. The fact that the Union had to grant 
its consent to Russia’s membership in the WTO also proved an essential tool, but the EU lost 
this asset as soon as the agreement was reached in 2004. However, before Russia accedes 
to the WTO, limiting its access to the Union’s market will still remain an instrument of the EU 
economic policy. 
Last but not least, regulations governing the movement of persons across the EU-
Russian border are also the Union’s policy tool. The issue of free movement concerning the 
Kaliningrad region was not settled in favor of Moscow, which expected that the visa regime 
between Russia and the EU could be facilitated or a visa-free regime for Russian citizens 
could be introduced. Similarly, in the Kremlin’s view, the Schengen system will remain an 
obstacle for the free movement of Russian citizens across the RF. However, some countries 
(including Germany and Italy) introduced a simplified visa regime in relations with the RF. 
The lack of readmission arrangements between Russia and the EU remained a problem, but 
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both parties managed to solve it in October 2005. The issue of a visa-free regime is chiefly a 
matter of prestige for Russia. 
Another political instrument that the EU has at its disposal may be the Union’s aid for 
the CIS states, introduced in the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy. It is 
another case in which an EU instrument is linked with the dynamics of the international 
system. The Union is a center that attracts post-communist countries, due to its economic 
and civilizational potential, which is not at all weakened by an apparent EU opposition to 
further enlargement. 
 
5. Areas of Russian-EU cooperation 
Russia’s cooperation with the EU mainly results from a strong mutual relationship 
between the two actors. In the political sphere, it manifests itself in the ambitions of 
participation in shaping the international order, dominated by the US, whereas both the 
actors are still relatively weak. In the economic sphere, this is a specific complementarity: 
Russia needs the Union’s investments and technologies, while the latter needs Russian 
natural resources. 
 
a. The political sphere 
The community of both players’ interests stems from the vision of the international 
order that they desire. It should remain polycentric (multipolar), with a dominance of the UN 
and the international law. Both Russia and the EU are not capable to oppose the US 
dominance on their own. Moreover, both the actors might prove too weak in comparison with 
the growing power of China. 
The official relations with the EU are a priority for Russia36. The EU also recognized 
Russia’s role in the ‘European Security Strategy’ adopted in December 2003. In this 
document, the Union described Russia as ‘a major factor in our security and prosperity’. 
Since October 2001 Russia got involved in the CFSP to an extent that is incomparable with 
other states. Regular meetings of the representatives from Russia and the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC) have taken place, as well as consultations within CFSP Troika 
Working Groups. The close cooperation manifested itself in the setting up of the Russian-EU 
Permanent Partnership Council in 2004. The similarities between both actors’ visions of the 
international order were also apparent when Russia adopted the Kyoto Protocol, which made 
it possible for the Protocol to enter into force despite the US opposition. 
                                                 
36 Opening address at the Russia-European Union Summit, Moscow, 10.05.2005, 
http://president.kremlin.ru (11.05.2005). 
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However, the efficiency of this cooperation has been low and in fact it failed to go 
beyond rhetoric declarations. The verbal objection against the unilateral US policy will not 
substitute for concrete actions. It is easier to reach an agreement with regard to extra-
European issues, which do not involve both actors’ interests at the same time. It stems from 
the specific EU approach to Russia, with the latter regarded as a desired partner in a global 
cooperation, while the European order should be shaped by means of the Union’s rules. 
Therefore, some Russian commentators refer to it as a system crisis of mutual relations, 
resulting from the lack of a vision and a strategic objective of both the actors37. 
The aforementioned cooperation regarding non-European regions, limited to 
declarations, will not help both actors meet their political objectives. The best example is the 
issue of the Greater Middle East. Both the actors border on this area and are vulnerable to 
threats that come from it; they also cooperate in the framework of the Middle East quartet. 
And again, the cooperation has resulted from weakness and attempts to influence American 
decisions regarding this region. Russia and the EU agree as to the post-war normalization in 
Iraq and the developments in the Middle East. At the same time however, they cannot force 
any significant changes in US policy. It is remarkable that the Russian-EU convergence of 
views proves incomplete on concrete issues, such as Iran and its nuclear program. The EU 
would like to stop Iran from gaining nuclear capabilities, while Russia does not intend to give 
up the cooperation in nuclear program, which provides it with significant financial benefits. 
Moreover, Iran is Russia’s strategic partner in the region. 
A good example of the aforementioned limitations of the cooperation is the European 
security area, which failed to be a breakthrough. In October 2001, a declaration of dialogue 
and cooperation in this area was adopted. In October 2001, regular meetings of 
representatives from Russia and the Political and Security Committee (the main body as 
regards the ESDP) to serve as a forum for cooperation. However, the balance of cooperation 
in military matters has remained poor. The conception of the Russian-European Theater 
Missile Defense (based on Russian S-300 and S-400 missiles) has also failed to go beyond 
declarations. Joint mine clearance activities were planned but they have not yet been 
undertaken. Russia suggested that the EU use Russian air transport forces, but this proposal 
was actually turned down (the EU only declared to consider it; however, it will soon have A-
400M airlift carriers at its disposal and the use of Ukrainian air forces is also under 
consideration). In August 2003, five representatives from the RF ministry of internal affairs 
participated in the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EU 
consistently rejects Russia’s cooperation proposals, offering political consultations on various 
levels instead. The establishing of closer contacts between the Russian and EU military 
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bodies, particularly with the European Defense Agency, has been declared, however, the so 
far performance gives little hope for successful developments. 
In the Kremlin’s view, a notable issue of the Russian-EU cooperation should be the 
war on Islamic terror, particularly after the 2004 attacks in Madrid and the 2005 attacks in 
London. Russia has repeatedly emphasized the community of interests with the EU in this 
area. In this perspective, Russia’s activities in the Caucasus are referred to as ‘solving a 
common European problem’38. Russia considers itself as an ‘antemurale’ that protects 
Europe from the Islamic terror. The EU did not quite accepted such a stance, although it 
started to recognize some Chechen organizations as terrorist groups, and also the approach 
to Chechen emigrants changed negatively. 
 
b. The economic sphere 
The EU is Russia’s largest trading partner. This relation is asymmetric, since trade 
with Russia accounts for only 5% of the EU’s overall trade. What matters is the character of 
the trade, which involves natural resources supplies. In 2000, the EU accounted for 40% of 
Russian trade. Russia provides over 20% of the EU’s needs in natural gas and 16% in oil. In 
2001, 79% of foreign investments in Russia came from EU states, with a total value of almost 
$30 billion. In May 2004, 25 EU states accounted for more than a half of the Russian foreign 
trade (55%). Moreover, these states may be partners in the Russian industries, which 
retained competitiveness in global markets: space, energy, chemistry and metallurgy 
industries. Today’s apparent lack of stable trade balance may become a problem for Russia 
in a longer-term perspective. In fact, Russia exports mostly natural resources to the EU and 
imports finished goods. 
A further economic Russian-EU cooperation may encounter obstacles if Russia does 
not become a member of the WTO. In this connection, the EU demanded that Russia inter 
alia introduce liberalization of its gas market. Another obstacle for Russia on its way to the 
WTO is, in the Union’s view, the development of Russia’s ambitious plans to pursue the 
economic cooperation within the CIS. Eventually, the EU forwent some requirements as to 
Russia’s accession to the WTO; the agreement on this issue was signed May 21, 2004, in 
Moscow. 
The development of the Russian natural resources distribution infrastructure has 
remained a problem. Russia expects that the Union’s members can be divided with respect 
to resources supplies. The best example here is a developing project of a gas pipeline 
across the Baltic Sea, which would link Russia with Germany. Poland would lose transit fees, 
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although from the economic point of view the construction of a second leg of the Yamal 
pipeline would be a cheaper solution, as some experts say (one should bear in mind that 
Russia committed itself to doing so). Russia aims at diversifying its distribution routes. 
At the same time, cooperation in the economic sphere has apparently encountered 
limitations. Russia regards the EU as forcing every possible trade concessions. For instance, 
it demanded that Russia cancel payments it collects from foreign airlines flying along the 
Trans-Siberian air corridor. The fact that Russia has to adopt European regulations, without 
participation in its making, is also a contentious issue. Both sides hold grudges against each 
other as regards access limitations concerning each other’s market. The EU demands that 
Russia liberalize individual sectors, such as air transport, gas industry, etc. 
In the first months after the 2004 EU enlargement, another dispute emerged, 
regarding the extension of the ‘Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Russia and 
the European Union’ on the new member states. It was settled April 27, 2004. Russia’s main 
argument concerned financial losses incurred due to the enlargement. 
 
c. Common spaces as a deepened Russia-EU cooperation 
A conception of a deepened cooperation between Russia and the EU for the first time 
emerged in May 2001. In practice, a formula of the so-called Russia-EU common spaces 
emerged, covering four areas: economy; external security; freedom, security and justice 
(internal security); research, education and culture. It was meant to replace the impractical 
formula of the Russia-EU partnership and to fill the vacuum that appeared after the Central 
and Eastern European countries have joined the EU. During the Russia-EU summit in Rome 
in 2003, the first proposal concerning such a conception was put forward. The growing 
discrepancy of opinion between the two partners postponed the practical implementation of 
the common spaces. Not until the Moscow summit May 10, 2005, were the so-called 
roadmaps adopted, regarding the four common spaces of the Russia-EU cooperation. 
The first version of a common European economic space was presented in 
November 2003 by External Relations Commissioner Christopher Patten and Russian 
Deputy Prime Minister Victor Khristenko. The common economic space is meant to help 
develop ‘an open integrated market’, based on the four freedoms of movement of goods, 
persons, capital and services. It would force Russia to adopt some European law, which – 
due to a lack of Russia’s participation in the decision-making process – would provide the 
Union with a powerful means of pressure on Moscow39. At the same time, the common 
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economic space, setting up a single internal market, could not function properly without 
common legal platform. 
The common external security space reflected the desired vision of the world order. It 
declared aiming at establishing a multipolar international order, recognizing the common 
responsibility for international security, especially in the close neighborhood of the EU and 
Russia, and emphasizing the community of values. The priority areas of cooperation 
included: 
- war on terror; 
- non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and preventing the movement thereof; 
- cooperation in crisis management; 
- cooperation in civil defense. 
The Russia-EU dialogue on security is also the most developed one in comparison 
with the dialogues that the EU pursues with other international actors, including the United 
States. At the same time, the dynamics of the Russia-EU relations regarding security is, to a 
great extent, determined by very close ties between Europe and the US, stemming from the 
membership in NATO. It provides the EU with a defense umbrella, thanks to which it can 
undertake actions to regulate the security environment with the aid of non-military measures 
(NATO enlargement preceded the EU enlargement). 
The common internal security space seems impossible to establish without the 
community of values (there is, however, no such community between Russia and the EU). It 
covers juridical cooperation and organized crime prevention, which is in fact impossible 
without courts’ independence or incorruptible legal protection bodies. Also, a high degree of 
trust between the partners seems indispensable40. Russia underestimates the so-called ‘soft 
security’ issues, which are crucial to internal security cooperation. 
The common space in terms of education, science and culture seems the most 
realistic. Russia is anxious to establish the mutual recognition of degrees, which would 
accelerate the harmonization of education systems (in fact it would mean the adoption, by 
Russia, of the formal rules of the Bologna process41). 
Since Russia does not in fact participate in the decision-making process in the EU, 
Russian commentators point out possible benefits of the conception of the four spaces. 
Firstly, the cooperation would support the ‘Europeanization’ of Russian officials, who would 
get acquainted with the decision-making mechanism of the EU. Secondly, the Brussels 
officials would become more aware of Russia’s problems, and therefore they could start 
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taking them into account in the decision-making process42. Some commentators consider the 
adoption of the aforementioned roadmaps to be Russia’s final step towards the integration 
with the rest of Europe. 
 
6. Areas of rivalry between Russia and the European Union 
The Russian-EU rivalry primarily results from the dynamics of developments on the 
European continent. The conflict of interests between the politically developing EU and 
Russia – struggling to protect its former sphere of influence – seems inevitable. It is 
heightened by the mutual misunderstanding and differences in political values. The rivalry 
also stems from the lack of vision of the other side’s role and the deep transformation that 
both actors have to cope with. 
 
a. The shape of the European order 
The rivalry between Russia and the EU follows the clash of two superpowers: one 
that has already failed and one that is probably emerging. The European integration so far, 
coupled with the EU enlargement with the former Eastern bloc states, caused a fundamental 
change in Russia’s geostrategic position. For the first time in a few centuries a powerful actor 
has emerged just next to Russia. It tends to block Russia’s expansion (not always 
intentionally) and, in a long-term perspective, it may even pose a threat of eliminating Russia 
from the European order. Russia has never faced a single Europe (even in Napoleon’s era it 
allied itself with Great Britain and Sweden); it has always remained a crucial component of 
the European balance of power. The EU, which has no traditional strategic culture, typical for 
a superpower with a uniform political center, unconsciously behaves like a predator state – 
creating an enduring sphere of influence, based on economy. At the same time it does not 
leave any space or a buffer zone for Russia. The EU strength is based on the legal and 
economic unification of new members, rather than on its armed forces or foreign policy. From 
this point of view, the Union becomes a postmodern empire. 
As early as in 1999, Russia provided the European Commission with a list of 
economic losses it would incur due the 2004 EU enlargement. The crucial issue – chiefly for 
prestigious reasons – became the communication between the Kaliningrad enclave and 
Russia. Some Russian authorities regarded this issue as a litmus test to assess the value of 
the Russian-EU partnership43. Eventually, the European view prevailed, based on the 
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Union’s law cohesion; it also proved that the Kremlin failed to understand the way the EU 
works. The heads of Western states are also to be blamed; Jacques Chirac, for instance, 
gave hope to Russia that this issue could be politically settled, not necessarily in accordance 
with the Union’s law44. 
The aforementioned sphere of European security serves a good example of the new 
situation. The Union did not directly rejected Russia’s participation in the ESDP, but clearly 
demanded that Russia comply with the rules set out by the Union. On this basis, Russia can 
actively contribute to military actions pursued by the EU but has to comply with the same 
rules as other non-EU states do, i.e. with no voice. Even the areas of cooperation with 
Russia contained in the roadmap reflect the Union’s perception of international security 
(manifested by the ‘European Security Strategy’). It means that Russia is actually excluded 
from the decision-making process concerning the European security system. 
 
b. The European Union’s involvement in the post-Soviet area 
Russia considers the EU as a potential center that may attract post-USSR states, 
which directly weakens Moscow’s power to integrate the post-Soviet area. Russia is not an 
attractive center in political, economic or civilizational sense. The Common Economic Space, 
launched in 2003, serves as a good example. Ukraine’s commitment to this conception has 
significantly declined after the government change following the Orange Revolution. Russia 
thought the CES to be a way of retaining its influence in key post-Soviet states (especially in 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan) and of strengthening its position in the international arena by the 
creation of a powerful economic bloc that would support Moscow. The EU is Russia’s serious 
rival as far as economic and civilizational potential is concerned, even though it officially 
denies that the CIS states could join the EU. These states are aware that it is impossible to 
function simultaneously within two economic blocs that promote supranational integration 
(the CES was designed to meet these characteristics). Fears that the CIS states would 
accede to the EU, although the Union’s political plans do not currently provide for it, are the 
most crucial potential reason of a dispute with the EU. The change in Russian politics is 
evidenced by a declining opposition against Ukraine’s possible accession to NATO. The 
possibility of Ukraine’s accession to the EU causes fears that a new iron curtain between 
Russia and the West could emerge45. 
Moreover, Russia considers the European Union’s involvement in Ukraine or Moldova 
a potential intervention of the West in Russia’s exclusive competencies. In 2003, the Russian 
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peace plan for the settlement of the crisis in Transdnestria was rejected, which in some 
Russian politics’ view was due to the EU intervention. Russians think that Western policy in 
Eastern Europe is either isolationist or it aims at restraining Russia46. However, in the EU’s 
view, the borderland between the EU and Russia is a source of potential crises and political 
confrontation. Both Russia and the EU are interested in maintaining stability in their close 
neighborhood. Russia seems to have believed that it would maintain its dominance in the 
CIS region and that the EU could accept it in exchange for the stability. For instance, 
however, at the OSCE meeting in Maastricht in December 2003 the Union demanded that 
Russia fulfill its commitments (to withdraw military bases from Georgia and Moldova until the 
end of 2003), which showed that the Union was not going to respect the Russian sphere of 
influence. 
Russia’s policy towards Poland can be seen as a consequence of its policy towards 
the EU. Poland is thought to be vitally interested in establishing even closer relations 
between the Union and Ukraine and to be consistently supporting Ukrainian accession to the 
EU. Similarly, Polish actions that back up the whole Union’s involvement in Byelorussian 
affairs are seen as posing a threat to Russian interests in the CIS. The European 
Neighborhood Policy is another contentious issue. Russia regards it as an introduction to 
extend the EU’s power over this area and to link it with the EU legal and institutional network. 
 
c. The conflict between political values of Russia and the European Union 
Another reason for Russian-EU rivalry is a lack of trust in mutual relations. In the case 
of the EU it stems from uncertainty as to where the political and economic order of Russia 
will evolve. Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Russia declared the will to rebuild democracy and 
a free market economy, which was at least partly reflected in political practice. Ten years ago 
it seemed that Russia shared the common European values, such as human and civil rights, 
regionalism, etc.47 Currently, however, the Russian government is even more openly aiming 
to introduce the authoritarian order, with the authorities interfering in the economic sphere, 
for instance, by means of a selective fiscal policy. 
An ongoing evolution of Russia’s political system towards increasing the 
competencies of the executive power at the expense of the legislative authority has provoked 
criticism on the part of EU bodies. At the same time, it is a consequence of the approach 
which Russia itself has adopted, repeatedly emphasizing that it belongs to the European 
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civilization. Since the end of 2003 Western states more often judge the Russian 
democratization process to have been stopped or even reversed. The arrest and detention of 
Yukos owner Mikhail Khodorkovsky largely supported such an assessment48. 
Although individual EU states could agree a compromise with Russia as regards law 
and order, democracy and human rights, the European Commission and the European 
Parliament have adopted an essentially more principal stance. Commissioner for External 
Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner, is thought by Russians as ‘demanding’ in matters 
concerning the observance of democratic standards (which she announced already at the 
hearing in the European Parliament). The conflict in Chechnya and the Kremlin’s policy 
therein, which reflect the conflict of values, have played a rather secondary role in mutual 
relations. Individual states yield to Russia’s pressure, reducing their criticism of the Chechen 
war. The EU bodies express criticism more often, as they are less vulnerable to Russian 
foreign policy tools. 
 
7. The role of cooperation with France and Germany at the background of 
Russia’s policy towards the European Union 
The consequence of closer political cooperation within the EU is that Russia is more 
often negotiating with a single political partner, which significantly reduces possible 
diplomatic maneuvers. Therefore, the relations with key EU states, particularly with France 
and Germany, play a crucial role in Russian policy towards the EU. Creating an ‘alliance’ with 
them has become a permanent element of Russian post-Cold War policy. 
Russia’s policy towards Germany has always been a crucial element of the European 
direction. Both states considered the mutual relations as particularly important for the overall 
European order, which is evidenced by a history of cooperation and conflicts with regard to 
primacy in Europe. The current policy has been strongly influenced by Germany’s gratitude 
for the former USSR's consent to its reunification. This factor did not disappear along with the 
end of Helmut Kohl’s rule; it has only evolved. Both states have shown ‘proofs of being a 
superpower’ to each other, which is to mask the fact that they have been losing their 
influence on the international order. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder gained support to boost 
the role of Germany in the international agenda49. 
Virtually nothing spoils the Russian-German relations, such as historical issues, 
territorial disputes, returning national art, rehabilitation of the German minority in Russia. The 
relations with Germany provoke no emotional reactions in Russia. Some German politicians, 
                                                 
48 Carl Bildt, ‘Sobytija w Rossii smutili jejo partnierow’, Rossija w globalnoj politikie, Vol. 2, № 1, 
Jan-Feb 2004, pp. 64-65. 
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particularly from CDU/CSU, oppose pursuing a cooperation policy with Russia at the 
expense of other partners of Germany. Also in the case of Germany, cooperation cannot be 
based on common values. However, the range of common interests is wide, including a 
significant role of trade: the Russian-German trade amount to almost 30 billion euro. On the 
other hand, Germany is the fourth foreign investor as regards direct investment and the 
largest recipient of Russian fuels (20% of Russian exports). The project of a gas pipeline 
across the Baltic Sea will strengthen this mutual relationship50. Both players’ views on the 
international order are quite convergent, particularly as regards providing the UN with a 
decisive role in such issues as the UN Security Council's authorization for the use of force in 
the international relations 
Germans think that Russia should be a part of European politics, regardless of its 
internal problems. Europe should help Russia create an efficient market economy. It is 
Russia’s stability that is most important. Russia and Germany should play a decisive role in a 
final unification of Europe and account for a concrete base for the so-called four common 
spaces51. In 2005, the Russian-German relations have been intensified, with the culmination 
during the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the end of the Second World War and the 
750th anniversary of the city of Kaliningrad. President Putin repeatedly underlined the role of 
Russian-German cooperation for the successful developments on the European continent52. 
A draft analysis of Russian-French relations create an impression that their level is 
the same as in the case of Russian relations with Germany. Summit meetings take place 
with the same frequency. Moreover, in 2002 Russia and France set up the Security 
Cooperation Council (at the level of foreign and security ministers). Military cooperation 
proposals include ammunition production, heavy-lift helicopter production and space 
cooperation53. 
However, the Russian-French rapprochement is a matter of tactics54. The directions 
of both states’ internal and external policies are not at all convergent. In the case of Russia, it 
is about the concentration of power and geopolitics. In the case of France, it is a multicultural 
society as far as internal policy is concerned, and a multicultural globalization (contrary to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
49 Interview of the President Vladimir Putin with German television channels ARD and ZDF, 
5.05.2005, http://president.kremlin.ru (8.05.2005). 
50 Katrin Bastian, Roland Götz, ‘Unter Freunden? Die deutsch-russische Interessenalianz’, Blätter 
für deutsche und internationale Politik, № 5/2005, p. 583. 
51 Interview with William Walles ‘<<Wlast’ w Rossii protiwostoit wsiemu, czto ona rasceniwajet 
daże kak potencialnoje wmieszatielstwo Zapada>>‘, Profil’, www.globalaffairs.ru/articles/3761.html 
(11.05.2005). 
52 Interview of the President Vladimir Putin with German television channels ARD and ZDF, 
5.05.2005, http://president.kremlin.ru (8.05.2005). 
53 ‘French Agree to Military Project’, The Moscow Times, 21.01.2005. 
54 This view was presented by Igor Tschernov, Saint-Petersburg State University, at a lecture 
delivered in the Institute for International Relations, Warsaw University, in May 2005. 
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American model of globalization). One could say that there is nothing new about the 
cooperation between Paris and Moscow (or St. Petersburg): in 1894, the republican France 
established a close military alliance with the tsarist Russia. The level of mutual relations is 
lower due to a lack of strong economic cooperation. France regards Russia in the first place 
as a geopolitical partner, who can help counterbalance the US dominance. 
Russian policy towards Germany and France was to provide the Kremlin with an 
instrument to influence the EU policy and privileged relations with this organization. Such an 
approach stems from the view that mutual relations are more important than the relations 
with the EU as a whole and can serve as a means of cementing the divisions within the EU. 
What is characteristic is that Russia has held strategic talks (concerning such issues as the 
natural resources supplies) only with individual states, exploiting the lack of a coherent EU 
policy on energy security. At the same time Germany and Russia are seen as ‘advocates’ of 
Russian interests in the EU. Both these states use the privileged relations with Russia to 
strengthen their own position in the Union. 
 
8. Effectiveness of Russia’s policy towards the European Union so far and 
prospects of the Russia-EU relations (also after 2008) 
Russia seems to misunderstand the change in the European order over the past 
quarter of century. The problem it has faced since the end of the Second World War is that it 
has been too weak to gain power over Europe, but also too strong to become an ‘average’ 
European superpower, like Great Britain or France. 
The cooperation with the EU as a whole and support for the deepened European 
integration could accelerate the emergence of a partner for the Russian Federation. Russia’s 
approach to the EU as an independent international partner is split between seeking an anti-
American partner and fearing that the integrated Europe will become a dominating power on 
the European continent and deprive Russia of its influence in the western part of the CIS. 
Russia will continue to conduct the policy of dividing European states, apparently fearing that 
today’s Union may transform into a uniform political actor. This strategy is based on the fact 
that the unity of the European Union makes any negotiations more difficult for Russia. 
Tightening political ties would mean the end of Russia’s capabilities of interfering with 
Europe. 
Russia’s problem is the actual lack of a strategic vision of the European direction in its 
foreign policy. Russia is mostly reacting to Brussels activities. It cannot decide whether it is 
interested in a limited cooperation in a long-term perspective or in a future integration. The 
Kremlin has only declared that it does not want to join the EU. Moreover, Russia’s foreign 
policy instruments (generally political) seem to have limitations when used towards the EU. 
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The Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis have failed to improve the effectiveness of the European 
dimension of Russian foreign policy. Moscow has neither negotiated a privileged status for 
the Kaliningrad region nor prevented the participation of the Union’s representative in the 
settlement of the Ukrainian crisis. Putin failed to persuade Europe that Russia has exclusive 
rights to Central Europe and in the CIS. In specific issues (vide Kaliningrad) it is Russia that 
more often made concessions. 
As European policy became more autonomous, Russia got more concerned that the 
EU would transform into an independent geopolitical actor. Even the prospective weakening 
of the US position, following deepening trans-Atlantic disputes, does not reduce Russia’s 
fears about the future position of the Union. Undoubtedly, the European direction of Russian 
policy has become more independent and less subordinated to the Russian-American 
relations (which was a fact after the Cold War). 
Russia and the European Union will have to work out a new agreement, because the 
current one will expire in 2007. Russia will have to decide whether to prolong the current one 
(whereby some provisions have not yet entered into force or are already obsolete) or to 
negotiate a completely new agreement. The conflict between the external and internal 
Russian policy poses a serious problem. The former has already focused, to a large extent, 
on the cooperation with the EU; the latter is evolving in a direction that is opposite to that 
introduced by the EU. It creates a serious obstacle for the establishment of a true partnership 
and reduces the range of potential solutions to the limited cooperation55. 
Russia has repeatedly declared a strategic partnership with the EU. On such 
occasions a term of Great Europe emerges, which is considered by Russians as an end of 
Cold War divisions56. In fact, this conception provides Russia with an equal right to shape the 
international order. Russia fears that a model of ‘association without integration’ would force 
it into adopting the Union’s regulations, and provide no influence on decisions regarding 
these regulations. In this way, without membership in the Union, Russia would become a sort 
of the Union’s colony. 
Failing to pursue close integration could provide Russia with essential benefits, 
mainly due to good bilateral relations with individual states (such as Germany, France or 
Italy) and worse relations with EU bodies. Therefore, the strengthening of individual states is 
convenient to Moscow. However, a loose model of European integration (a Europe of 
different speeds) would give those states which have EU aspirations (rejected by Brussels, 
as in the case of Ukraine) more opportunities to tighten cooperation, which in turn would 
result in imposing further limitations to Russia’s influence. 
                                                 
55 Arbatova, Ryzkov, op.cit., p. 197. 
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A decreasing share in the world GDP coupled with a demographic crisis can limit 
Russia’s self-dependance as a geopolitical center. If present trends remain unchanged, 
within 20 years Russia will cease to be a self-dependent center of power and will have to join 
the stronger party, the European Union being the best choice. China and the US are out of 
the question, since Russia could be nothing but a ‘younger brother’ of these states. The 
united and at the same time flexible Europe, providing much economic freedom and little 
supranational component, could be a form of cooperation to which Russia could aspire in the 
future57. The Russian perception allows for two basic models: quasi-federation or an alliance 
with a common law, currency and values. Some Russian political scientists fear that within 
15-25 years Russia will not be able to act in the international order as an independent 
partner. In this case, the EU membership, though impossible within the following decade, 
could be a way to retain, at least partly, the position of a superpower. 
                                                                                                                                                        
56 See for instance: Opening address at the Russia-European Union Summit, Moscow, 
10.05.2005, http://president.kremlin.ru (11.05.2005). 
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